

**INTERNATIONAL TAX DESIGN
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY:
EVALUATING BEPS AND LOOKING
TO THE FUTURE**

DECEMBER 2-3, 2021

The Global Impact of BEPS Reforms

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REVENUE IMPACTS OF “BEPS 2.0”

- Estimates overall
 - OECD 2020: with US GILTI \$60-100 b (at a 12.5 percent min tax); \$42-70b w/o GILTI
 - OECD now: \$150b (with new assumptions presumably including 15 percent...other?)
 - Oxford 2020: assuming 10 percent minimum effective rate = \$32 b without GILTI
- Is that a lot?
 - 2020 OECD estimate range = 1.7 to 2.8 percent of global CIT
 - Global CIT = about 3 percent of global GDP
 - So, no...

REVENUE IMPACTS (CONT.)

- Where does this come from?
 - Pillar One, Amount A: no revenue impact; shift around about \$125 b in corporate profits among [large?] countries
 - Pillar One, Amount B (marketing and distribution safe harbor; aims at non-OECD) hasn't been modeled by OECD
 - Pillar Two: the main event
- Who gets it?
 - Directly—HQ countries (large...)
 - Indirectly—reduction in profit shifting: OECD therefore estimated comparable gains across all country income categories
- Who loses?
 - IMF 2020: investment hubs/low tax

PILLAR ONE

- Scope
 - MNEs with global turnover greater than Euro 20 b and profitability greater than 10 percent (= largest 100 ish MNEs)
 - Exclude extractives and regulated financial services
 - Nexus rule: MNE must derive at least Euro 1 million from jurisdiction; but (compromise for dev cos.) if GDP less than Euro 40 b, nexus set at Euro 250 thousand
- Impact?
 - Reallocate 25 percent of profit above 10 percent of revenue
 - OECD estimates that low income countries will get “[some ->]” But, mainly, reallocate among advanced countries
 - Oxfam—”52 dev cos will get 0.025 percent of their collective GDP under P. One”

PILLAR ONE (CONT.)

- Significance?
 - More in the ground-breaking precedents: formulary/unitary allocation; shift to market jurisdictions...
 - Elimination of DSTs! A (the?) goal of the US
 - Agreement to halt so far from 8 major jurisdictions, latest India
 - Stop (pause?) trade wars

PILLAR TWO

- What was/is the goal?
 - Halt tax competition, OR
 - Major MNEs pay at least some minimum total corporate tax somewhere
 - Both?
- The “Substance Carve Out”
 - Allow tax incentives still? (a compromise)
 - Tax residual profits, v. minimum tax on all profits
 - Impact on tax competition depends on how structured—but reduces the impact

PILLAR TWO (CONT.)

- Who gets the “top ups?”
 - Oxfam: G7/EU two-thirds of new tax; poorest countries less than 3 percent
 - This is the direct take: results from primacy of IIR over UTPR
 - Will STTR have a significant effect for LICs? (Also not yet modeled by OECD...refusal to extend to various service payments, may indicate that's where the money is...)
- Tax competition
 - What should low tax countries do? Indirect effects allow higher CITs? But see, competition...
 - Ireland (eg) proposing to apply 15 percent rate to in-scope MNEs; keep 12.5 percent rate for all other corporations

IMPLICATIONS OF/FOR US

- Current legislative proposals:
 - Pillar Two: move GILTI to jurisdictional approach in line with OECD—increases revenue above TCJA version
 - General agreement can be done through “reconciliation” (simple majorities)
 - Failed to increase rate above 15
 - Pillar One: a different story
 - Large proportion of in-scope MNEs are US resident headquartered (roughly half)
 - Weight of opinion that treaty changes required, which means 2/3 of senate
 - What if US doesn’t adopt?....